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Standing in for the State: Defending Ballot Initiatives 
in Federal Court Challenges 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent case law effectively obliterates the defensibility of voter-
enacted initiative measures that are challenged in federal court and 
that executive officials refuse to defend. The new requirements 
imposed by the Supreme Court not only exclude proponents of a 
given initiative from defending the initiative but also preclude almost 
all others who would defend it. This unique process of lawmaking 
allows the people to vote directly on issues and so it is, by definition, 
democracy at its finest. However, current law threatens its 
continued benefits. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hollingsworth v. Perry1 violates 
what should be an important principle in federal decision-making: 
state sovereignty outweighs a bare desire for uniformity in federal 
law. The Supreme Court violated this principle when it decided that 
the initiative proponents could not represent the State of California 
unless they were agents of the state. The Court’s only legitimate 
justification seemed to be a desire to preserve uniformity in the 
federal law.2 Though the Court framed the case in the context of 
federal standing, California’s approval of the proponents’ authority 
to step into the state’s shoes was a question of state law as the 
decision only truly affected California and similar states. No valid 
federal interests were seriously implicated. By overruling the 
California Supreme Court on this issue, the Supreme Court severely 
undermined California’s status as a separate sovereign. 
The repercussions of this federal overreaching are severe, 
extending beyond the problem of undefended public initiatives. 
Thus, as the Supreme Court created the problem, the Supreme 
Court should mend the doctrine by allowing states to appoint their 
own defenders, even in federal court, as long as the state’s intent is 
clearly communicated. While other remedies might allow for 
initiatives to be defended in some situations, those remedies are 
 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 2. See infra note 109 (addressing the possibility that the Court was merely delaying a 
sweeping decision on same-sex marriage). 
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potentially flawed and provide an unnecessarily low level of 
protection to states and citizen initiatives. A change in the doctrine 
would allow for a much-needed bolstering of citizen initiatives and 
would restore a proper balance to the federalism system. 
This Comment describes both the need for doctrinal changes 
and the direction such changes should take. Part II outlines the role 
of ballot initiatives in past and present American society, discussing 
their boon to the democratic process. Part III establishes a 
framework for the issues involved, with a discussion of the federal 
standing doctrine and cases leading up to Hollingsworth v. Perry. It 
then analyzes Hollingsworth in depth and reveals how ballot 
initiatives may soon become things of the past. Part IV argues that, 
based on federalism principles of state autonomy in deciding state 
issues, Hollingsworth is flawed and the only viable solution is for the 
Supreme Court to fix the law. Part V concludes. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BALLOT INITIATIVES 
The public initiative process began in the early twentieth century 
in reaction to state legislatures’ unresponsiveness to the people’s 
will.3 In California, “the progressive movement . . . that introduced 
the initiative power into [its] Constitution grew out of dissatisfaction 
with the then-governing public officials and a widespread belief that 
the people had lost control of the political process.”4 Twenty-four 
states have now adopted the ballot initiative as a form of lawmaking.5 
The people of those states proposed 2,421 initiatives from 1904 to 
2012, and 984 were eventually approved and enacted into law.6 
 
 3. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011). 
 4. Id. (citing Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 84–85 (Cal. 2009); Indep. Energy 
Producers Ass’n v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 191–93 (Cal. 2006)). 
 5. Overview of Initiative Use, 1900–2012, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT UNIV. 
OF S. CAL. (Jan. 2013), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20%282013-
1%29.pdf [hereinafter INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.]; see also Ballot Initiative Primer, 
CITIZENS IN CHARGE, http://www.citizensincharge.org/learn/primer (last visited Mar. 
24, 2015). 
 6. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., supra note 5 (detailing how the initiative process 
has played a particularly important role in the following states: Oregon (363 total proposed), 
California (352), Colorado (218), North Dakota (183), and Arizona (174)); see also Gavin 
Broady, Prop 8 Standing Ruling Shakes up Citizen Lawmaking, LAW 360 (June 26, 2013, 7:42 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/453181/prop-8-standing-ruling-shakes-up-citizen-
lawmaking (naming California’s initiative process “the most extensive citizen lawmaking 
platform” in the country and predicting that “[t]he impact [there] will be 
especially profound”). 
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According to Justice Kennedy, “the popular initiative is necessary 
to implement ‘the theory that all power of government ultimately 
resides in the people.’”7 Public initiatives are nonpartisan in nature,8 
so conservatives, liberals, and libertarians are similarly likely to 
benefit from them. They are simply a method of lawmaking available 
to all people, regardless of their ideology, and their destruction 
would harm people of all political persuasions.9 The initiative process 
is the most directly democratic form of lawmaking, and any 
 
 7. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at 1016) (referring to California’s ideals according to its 
Constitution); see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (“The essence of democracy is that 
the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not the other way 
around. Freedom resides first in the people without need of a grant from government. The 
California initiative process embodies these principles and has done so for over a century.”). 
 8. For example, a number of laws both banning and reinstating the death penalty were 
proposed in a number of states prior to 2002. Additionally, eleven laws were proposed to 
facilitate marijuana use (in addition to one that would ban it) in a number of states during that 
time. Statewide Initiatives Since 1904-2000, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT UNIV. OF S. 
CAL., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20
Boxes/Historical/Statewide%20Initiatives%201904-2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 9. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1005 (noting that the question of whether initiative 
proponents could assert the state’s interest in an initiative’s defense is a “fundamental 
procedural issue that may arise with respect to any initiative measure, without regard to its 
subject matter,” and listing other politically neutral scenarios that could arise) (second emphasis 
added); Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense: The State Shouldn’t Abandon 
Measures Passed by Voters, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-
initiatives-20130628 (“I vehemently opposed Proposition 8, but I believe it deserved its 
defense in court. California needs a mechanism to make that possible. . . . [T]he long-term 
implications of the ruling are disturbing.”); Doug Mataconis, Prop. 8, DOMA, and Standing 
in the Supreme Court, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/prop-8-doma-and-standing-in-the-supreme-court/ 
(quoting pundits that express concern on both sides of the Proposition 8 political debate and 
pointing out that “[t]his [standing issue] is an issue that has, interestingly, raised concerns 
both on the left and the right.”); Alison Frankel, Gay Marriage, Voters’ Rights and the Thorny 
Prop 8 Standing Problem, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2013/03/27/gay-marriage-voters-rights-and-the-thorny-prop-8-standing-
problem/?print=1&r= (acknowledging that a ruling denying standing to the proponents 
“would . . . implicate some difficult issues”). But see Spandan Chakrabarti, The Fate of Prop 8: 
Why a Dismissal on “Standing” is Good for Marriage Equality, THE PEOPLE’S VIEW (Mar. 26, 
2013), http://www.thepeoplesview.net/2013/03/the-fate-of-prop-8-why-dismissal-on.html 
(arguing that standing would not be a problem in the future for liberals, even if proponents of 
liberal initiatives were not granted standing); Kevin Drum, The Supreme Court’s Ruling on 
Prop. 8 is a Problem, but Probably Not That Big a Problem, MOTHER JONES (June 28, 2013, 
3:04 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/06/supreme-courts-ruling-
prop-8-problem-probably-not-big-problem (arguing that Proposition 8 was an exception to 
the norm that people usually have standing to sue). 
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nullification of the process—especially without the people’s 
consent—is cause for concern. 
III. FEDERAL STANDING AND BALLOT INITIATIVES 
The recent Supreme Court case Hollingsworth v. Perry10 
dramatically impaired the vitality of ballot initiatives. The Court 
determined who has standing to appeal federal decisions on behalf of 
a state. Now, if state officials refuse to defend them, public initiatives 
are left vulnerable and defenseless because almost no others are 
legally qualified to do so. 
Federal standing doctrine arises from Article III, section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which extends federal jurisdiction only to cases 
and controversies.11 “Cases and controversies,” as interpreted in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,12 mean that parties to a case must 
meet three elements as a “constitutional minimum”13: The parties 
(1) “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’”14 (2) “there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of,”15 and (3) “it must be ‘likely’ . . . that the injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”16 It is well established that “‘a 
State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its [laws].’”17 
Therefore, when state ballot initiatives are challenged in federal 
court, the state and its officials undoubtedly meet the Lujan 
requirements for standing to defend the state’s laws in court.18 
The remaining question, however, is whether anyone other than 
officials of the state can also have standing to defend state laws. 
 
 10. 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending judicial power to all cases and controversies). 
 12. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 13. Id. at 560. 
 14. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). 
 15. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
 16. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 17. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)). 
 18. A wealth of case law also addresses third-party standing and other prudential 
doctrines. However, these doctrines are irrelevant for purposes of this Comment because this 
Comment simply argues that others should be able to stand in place of the state (rather than as 
third parties). Under this argument, the “others” are no longer separated from the state but 
actually become representatives of the state. Because the state is deemed to have federal 
standing in these cases, these “others” are automatically granted standing. 
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A. Pre-Hollingsworth Jurisprudence 
Although the issue of whether state supreme courts could 
delegate authority to represent the state was not clearly decided until 
Hollingsworth19 in 2013, pre-Hollingsworth cases suggested that state 
courts might possess this authority. Two cases—Karcher v. May20 and 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona21—stand out in particular. 
1. Karcher v. May 
In Karcher v. May, the Supreme Court held that presiding 
officers in the New Jersey state legislature had standing so long as 
the state supreme court granted them authority to “represent the 
State’s interests.”22 In Karcher, the state court had conditioned this 
delegation of authority on the officers’ holding leadership positions, 
so when the legislators lost their leadership positions, and 
consequently lost the blessing of the state court, the Supreme Court 
denied them standing.23 The Supreme Court relied on this “state 
law,” as declared by the New Jersey high court, to determine 
whether these non-executive officers could stand in place of 
the state.24 
2. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona 
More recently, the Supreme Court again hinted that state 
endorsement may be dispositive for those seeking to represent the 
state’s interests in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.25 When 
state officials refused to appeal a decision rendering a part of the 
state’s constitution—which had been enacted through initiative—
unconstitutional, proponents of the ballot initiative attempted to 
represent the state’s interest. The Supreme Court ruled that the case 
was moot, and hence did not reach the merits or the question of 
standing, but expressed “grave doubts” as to whether proponents 
would have had standing.26 The reason for these doubts, though, is 
 
 19. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 20. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
 21. 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 22. 484 U.S. at 82. 
 23. Id. at 83. 
 24. Id. at 82–83. 
 25. 520 U.S. at 65. 
 26. Id. at 66. 
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instructive. The Court noted, inter alia, that it was “aware of no 
Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of 
Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of 
initiatives made law of the State.”27 This statement, while admittedly 
only dictum, suggested that the opinion of state law would be a 
substantial factor in determining whether proponents had standing. 
B. Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Despite the pre-2013 leanings toward deferring to state 
decisions, the Court’s recent holding in Hollingsworth v. Perry28 
completely reversed course. The Court required that those 
purporting to represent the state be formal agents of the state 
according to the Restatement of Agency,29 thus ruling out initiative 
proponents from ever representing the state and preventing state 
supreme courts from exercising their sole discretion in the matter. 
1. Proposition 8: Journey to the Supreme Court 
Certain members of the organization ProtectMarriage.com 
brought the now-famous Proposition 8 before California voters in 
2008.30 The initiative, which would make man-woman marriage the 
only recognizable and valid form of marriage under California’s 
Constitution,31 was passed into law by 52.3% of California’s 
electorate.32 After being upheld as constitutional by the California 
Supreme Court,33 two same-sex couples challenged the 
constitutional amendment in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983, alleging that the amendment violated the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 After the 
 
 27. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
 28. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 29. Id. at 2666–67. 
 30. Proposition 8’s journey began long before 2008. It was preceded in 2000 by the 
enactment of a similar proposition (22) forbidding same-sex marriage under statutory law. 
Proposition 22 was rejected as unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court on May 15, 
2008, which spurred Proposition 8. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 31. Letter from ProtectMarriage.com to Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Cal. Att’y 
Gen. (Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with author) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California.”). 
 32. Approval Percentages of Initiatives Voted into Law, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at 
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ballot-measures/pdf/approval-percentages-initiatives.pdf. 
 33. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). 
 34. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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named defendants—including the governor and state attorney 
general—refused to defend the constitutional amendment,35 the 
federal district court allowed the initiative’s proponents to 
intervene.36 The district court ultimately held that Proposition 8 was 
unconstitutional,37 and the proponents appealed the judgment to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.38 
Before the Ninth Circuit could reach the merits of the case, it 
needed to decide whether the proponents had federal standing to 
represent the State of California. Consequently, the court certified a 
question to the California Supreme Court, asking whether the 
proponents had “the authority to assert the State’s interest,” or, 
alternatively, whether the proponents had a “particularized interest 
in the initiative’s validity.”39 The California court answered the first 
question in the affirmative and thus saw no need to address the 
second question.40 
Both courts made it clear that this certified question in no way 
meant that the California Supreme Court was deciding whether the 
proponents had federal standing.41 However, they both agreed that 
 
 35. The named defendants were “California’s Governor, Attorney General and Director 
and Deputy Director of Public Health and the Alameda County Clerk-Recorder and the Los 
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk.” The Attorney General opined that the 
law was unconstitutional, while the other defendants refused to take a position on the matter. 
Id. at 928. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1003. 
 38. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 39. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1005 (Cal. 2011). The Court stated the following: 
As posed by the Ninth Circuit, the question to be decided is “[w]hether 
under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise 
under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure 
possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the 
authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity, which 
would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon 
its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the 
public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 40. Id. at 1015, 1033 (“[W]e conclude, for the reasons discussed above, that when the 
public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged state law or appeal a judgment invalidating 
the law decline to do so, under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the 
relevant provisions of the Elections Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative 
measure are authorized to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity, enabling the 
proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment 
invalidating the initiative.”). 
 41. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1074. 
BISHOP.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2015  2:15 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
128 
while the question was one of state law, such state questions are 
“antecedent to determining federal standing.”42 Thus, while clearly 
denying that California “has any ‘power directly to enlarge or 
contract federal jurisdiction’”43 or to “decide any issue of federal 
law,”44 both the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court 
agreed that the California Supreme Court could authoritatively 
declare that the proponents had “authority to assert the state’s 
interests”45—even in federal court. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied on the California Supreme Court’s answer to 
its certified question in deciding that the proponents had Article III 
standing to “assert the state’s interest . . . and to appeal [the] 
judgment.”46 The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s 
decision, holding that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.47 
2. The Supreme Court’s new standard: No standing unless official 
agents of the state 
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued two landmark 
same-sex marriage opinions: Hollingsworth v. Perry48 and United 
States v. Windsor.49 Rather than ruling on the merits in 
Hollingsworth, however, the Court denied the case for lack of 
jurisdiction.50 The Court held that because the proponents had no 
“‘particularized’ interest” of their own51 and were not “agents of the 
State,”52 they therefore lacked standing.53 
The Supreme Court was clear in declaring that those who would 
represent the state in federal courts must be formal agents of the 
state according to the requirements found in the Restatement of 
 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. (quoting Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 44. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1011. 
 45. Id. at 1005. 
 46. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1075. 
 47. Id. at 1096. 
 48. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 49. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 50. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 51. Id. at 2663 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is . . . concrete and particularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 52. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (judicial power extending to all cases and controversies). 
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Agency.54 In order to be a formal agent of the state, the Court 
established, one must answer to the state and have fiduciary duties to 
the state, among other requirements.55 The Court noted that neither 
the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals described the proponents as “agents of the people,” and 
therefore the most the proponents could do was to “argue in defense 
of Proposition 8” rather than stand in California’s place as parties to 
the case.56 While agency in some form had been alluded to as a 
possible requirement in at least one prior case,57 Hollingsworth was 
the first instance where the Restatement’s standard was set as a 
minimum requirement for those representing a state in federal court. 
This new requirement constrains the range of options available 
to state courts in designating who may represent the state’s interests. 
It implies that a state high court’s declaration is neither sufficient by 
itself nor the final word in deciding who may represent the state in 
federal court. Thus it seriously undermines the landmark case of Erie 
v. Tompkins58 and rejects the leanings—found in prior precedent59—
toward allowing state law to dictate who may represent the state.60 
The question of who may represent the state is a state question, so 
the decision tramples on the states’ authority to make their own laws 
free of federal intrusion. Consequently, it leaves citizen initiatives 
defenseless by denying federal standing to initiative proponents and 
most other would-be defenders of initiatives. This legal dilemma is 
alarming and calls for an immediate remedy.61 
 
 54. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–67. 
 55. Id. at 2657–58 (“Petitioners are not subject to the control of any principal, and they 
owe no fiduciary obligation to anyone. As one amicus puts it, ‘the proponents apparently have 
an unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, 
however and to whatever extent they choose to defend it.’”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 56. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (The Court was 
“aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to 
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”). 
 58. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see infra Part IV.A.2. 
 59. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65; Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987). 
 60. See supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 61. There are a number of proposed or theoretical solutions. The advantages and 
limitations of these proposals are discussed below. Infra Parts IV.C.1–5. 
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C. Post-Hollingsworth: The End of Public Initiatives? 
Hollingsworth eliminates much of the hope citizens might have 
had that laws enacted through public initiatives will endure. 
According to Hollingsworth, even express delegations of power by a 
state supreme court are insufficient to allow others to defend 
initiatives in place of the state, if those “others” are not official 
agents of the state under the Restatement of Agency.62 Thus, 
proponents of initiatives, such as those in Hollingsworth, will never 
be able to defend initiatives unless they find a way to double as 
official agents of the state. On its face, this does not seem overly fatal 
to the future of initiatives—after all, formal officials of the state are 
still allowed to defend the law under the new legal standard. 
However, trusting in this remedy will be misguided, because this 
“solution” will not result in initiatives being properly defended. 
An assurance that a given initiative will last only as long as the 
state executive agrees with it is weak indeed. Justice Kennedy 
expressed this frustration in his dissenting Hollingsworth opinion: 
“[The initiative’s] purpose is undermined if the very officials the 
initiative process seeks to circumvent are the only parties who can 
defend an enacted initiative when it is challenged in a legal 
proceeding.”63 State public officials were the very ones who were not 
defending the law in Hollingsworth, and the initiative process was 
originally created to bypass such nonresponsive public officials.64 
Therefore, some (and possibly many) public officials will not be 
willing, or at least not eager, to defend an initiative in court. At some 
point in time there is bound to be a state executive who disagrees 
with and is consequently unwilling to defend almost any initiative-
made law; when that point is reached, all that is needed to nullify the 
law is one lawsuit by one negatively affected citizen. With the 
resultant crumbling of public confidence in the initiative’s durability, 
the motivation for citizens to seek this source of lawmaking will be 
diminished and will likely lead to its eventual disuse. Justice Kennedy 
agreed: “Giving the Governor and attorney general this de facto veto 
will erode one of the cornerstones of the State’s governmental 
 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 63. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 64. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011). 
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structure.”65 While state courts theoretically could begin ordering 
executive officials to defend every law, this development is unlikely 
to take place and, even if implemented, would produce an 
undesirable outcome.66 It would be unfortunate to allow for the 
demise of such a democratic lawmaking process. 
IV. SAVING THE BALLOT INITIATIVE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The true solution to the initiative-defense problem ultimately 
depends on the Supreme Court changing its jurisprudence. 
Recognizing that the question of who can represent a state in federal 
court is truly a state, not federal, question of law leads to a principle 
that should guide the Supreme Court and lower federal courts: state 
sovereignty outweighs simply maintaining uniformity in federal law. 
Hollingsworth violated this principle, thus failing to give proper 
deference to California’s sovereignty. By so doing, Hollingsworth has 
impacted the continued viability and strength of the ballot initiative 
process. The Supreme Court should mend this doctrine by deferring 
to states when states delegate the authority to represent the state’s 
interest in court. 
A. Deciding Who Can Represent the State is a State Law Question 
In ruling on state court decisions in the context of federal law, 
occasionally federal courts are confronted with an issue that touches 
on constitutionally mandated areas (e.g., Article III standing) but is 
not an essential part of that mandated area (e.g., the issue of “who is 
the state?”). In such a setting, the mere desire of federal courts to 
establish uniformity in federal jurisprudence, combined with nothing 
more, does not justify them in overruling an unambiguous state high 
court decision of state law, where the ruling would significantly 
impinge on that state’s status as a separate sovereign. This guiding 
principle should direct federal courts when walking along the 
 
 65. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see State Executive 
Nondefense or “Failure to Defend,” COLUM. L. SCH. NAT’L ST. ATT’YS GEN. PROGRAM, 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/attorneys-general/ag-101-brief-introduction-world-attorneys-
general/state-attorney-general-nondefense (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (referring to numerous 
examples of state attorneys general refusing to defend a variety of laws since Hollingsworth). 
 66. Erwin Chemerinsky and Walter Dellinger propose that states enact laws requiring 
that an official be appointed in these cases. However, there seems to be no indication of states 
moving toward enacting such laws and, aside from preventative limitations in their proposals, 
states should not have to be limited to these narrow solutions. See infra Parts IV.C.1–2, 5. 
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“division-of-powers line;” otherwise, they can very easily exert 
undue control over states. 
1. Rationale behind the guiding principle 
The guiding principle, detailed above, should influence federal 
decisions because it is supported by precedent and sound public 
policy. As a starting point, the U.S. Supreme Court undoubtedly has 
the authority to review state court judgments, but that review only 
encompasses issues of federal law67 and certain state law issues where 
state law contradicts federal law.68 For the most part, state questions 
of law are left untouched by federal review; indeed, state sovereignty 
depends on this strict division of powers. If federal courts began 
overruling state law without bounds, eventually state law would 
become indistinguishable from federal law and each state would no 
longer be sovereign in its own sphere. Taken to the extreme, there 
would come to be no meaningful legal distinction between the fifty 
states, as all state law would be merged into federal law, resulting in 
an all-powerful centralized government.69 Thus, any impingement by 
federal courts on state law, however slight its impact or great its 
justification, has at least some negative effect on state sovereignty. 
This invasion of state authority stifles the creative genius that can 
otherwise develop through state experimentation. Consequently, 
significant impingements on state law should be met with 
careful skepticism. 
 
 67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (restricting the Supreme Court’s power to review state 
cases to only three situations where state decisions concern federal law); see also Hortonville 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) (“We are, of 
course, bound to accept the interpretation of [State] law by the highest court of the State.”); 
Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress’s Power to Direct State 
Judicial Action: Congress’s Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State 
Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 683 (1999). 
 68. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) 
(holding that the Constitution trumps state law and states are bound by U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions). 
 69. See Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, 20 NAT’L AFF., Summer 
2014, at 3 (arguing that Patrick Henry’s forecast of a “great consolidation of Government” 
“became a reality” during the last century). 
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The range of federal reasons for infringing on state law runs the 
gamut from desiring to establish uniformity in federal law to 
preserving important constitutional requirements. Some of these are 
justifiable, while others are not. On the one end, federal courts seek 
to create order, simplicity, and a clear standard for lower courts. 
While this pursuit is important, its significance pales in comparison 
to preserving constitutional requirements. Its limited significance 
usually should not justify overruling state law, especially when the 
ruling would significantly impinge on state law. In other words, in 
situations where a federal decision on state law makes no substantial 
difference to the preservation of the federal court’s authority but 
significantly and negatively affects state autonomy, federal courts 
should defer to state court decisions.70 
2. Federalism as a foundation: Why respect state law? 
Federalism principles support the guiding principle because they 
clarify why the federal courts should respect state courts. In the 
landmark case Erie v. Tompkins,71 the Court set forth that federal 
courts are to apply state law, and state court interpretations of that 
law, when cases involve substantive questions of state law.72 When the 
question is not entirely substantive and is in tension with federal 
interests, federal courts can still apply the state law unless it would 
work an “untoward alteration of the federal scheme.”73 Only when 
federal and state rules are in conflict do federal courts hold state rules 
to a higher standard or overrule them altogether.74 
 
 70. Ironically, the likely desire for “order, simplicity, and a clear standard” could still 
have been preserved in Hollingsworth while also respecting state sovereignty, as discussed infra 
Part IV.A.4.b. 
 71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 72. “While Erie doctrine typically applies to issues arising in diversity suits, it is also 
applicable to ‘questions of state law arising in a nondiversity case,’ like Hollingsworth.” Glenn 
S. Koppel, “Standing” in the Shadow of Erie: Federalism in the Balance in Hollingsworth v. 
Perry 2 n.2 (Aug. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=glenn_koppel 
(quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 563 (6th ed. 2009)). 
 73. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (“The dispositive 
question, therefore, is whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of § 
5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of 
civil cases.”). 
 74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965). 
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Furthermore, case law clearly illustrates that the federal 
government does not have power to command the state to enforce 
federal law.75 This suggests a certain respect for state autonomy, at 
least in some contexts. In New York v. United States76 and Printz v. 
United States,77 the Court held that the federal government was not 
allowed to force states to enforce federal legislation.78 Nor was 
Congress allowed to dictate to a state where to establish its capital.79 
Even assuming the Supreme Court was allowed constitutionally 
implied powers over states by virtue of some kind of “necessary and 
proper” clause power, as Congress has been granted,80 the Supreme 
Court would not be able to command states to act in a certain way 
outside the realm of federal law.  
3. Sovereign immunity cases support the guiding principle 
State sovereign immunity cases, decided under the Eleventh 
Amendment, have provided an interesting doctrinal setting to 
determine the extent of states’ power to define “who is the state” in 
the context of federal law. These cases both support the guiding 
principle and illustrate how it would be implemented. Sovereign 
immunity cases involve both federal and state issues: federal, in that 
the Eleventh Amendment provides states with immunity from most 
suits unless that immunity is waived;81 and state, in that states should 
be able to define their own identities as a matter of state law. 
 
 75. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is not for a federal court 
to tell a state who may appear on its behalf any more than it is for Congress to direct state law-
enforcement officers to administer a federal regulatory scheme, to command a state to take 
ownership of waste generated within its borders, or to dictate where a state shall locate its 
capital.”) (citations omitted). 
 76. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 77. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 78. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot 
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”); New York, 505 U.S. 
at 188 (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”). 
 79. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579–80 (1911). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”). McCulloch v. Maryland expounded on this, holding that 
the clause “purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government.” 17 
U.S. 316, 420 (1819). 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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In Lincoln County v. Luning,82 the Supreme Court held that a 
county in Nevada could not claim state immunity because the county 
was not “the state.”83 In so holding, the Court relied primarily on 
the Nevada Constitution and state court decisions.84 The Court 
emphasized that “the liability of counties . . . to suit is declared by 
the [Nevada] constitution itself,” and that “this liability . . . has been 
affirmed by the supreme court of Nevada” in three cases.85 These 
statements show trusting deference to state law for the question of 
“who is the state.” 
Almost a century later, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doyle,86 the Supreme Court created a new standard 
which asked whether political subdivisions are “arm[s] of the State” 
and held that a school board was not “the State” for sovereign 
immunity purposes because it was “more like a county or city 
than . . . an arm of the State.”87 The Court’s rationale was telling: it 
looked solely to Ohio state law in making its decision.88 “[U]nder 
Ohio law,” it reasoned, “the ‘State’ does not include ‘political 
subdivisions,’ and ‘political subdivisions’ do include local school 
districts.”89 All other considerations—whether they weighed for or 
against the school board—were also rooted in Ohio state law.90 
The Court further revised this doctrine in later years, nearly 
granting immunity in one case, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman,91 and outright denying it in another, Hess v. Port 
 
 82. 133 U.S. 529 (1890). 
 83. Id. at 530–31. 
 84. Id. at 530–32. 
 85. Id. at 530–31. 
 86. 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
 87. Id. at 280–81. Interestingly, the determination that counties could not be 
considered part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes depended on Lincoln, 133 U.S. 
at 130, and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717–21 (1973). As discussed 
previously, Lincoln relied heavily on the Nevada Constitution and court decisions in making its 
determination. 133 U.S. at 130–31. Moor did not directly support the principle. 411 U.S. at 
717 (merely stating that “this Court has recognized that a political subdivision of a State, 
unless it is simply ‘the arm or alter ego of the State,’ is a citizen of the State for 
diversity purposes”). 
 88. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280–81. 
 89. Id. at 280 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.01 (Page Supp. 1975)). 
 90. Id. at 280–81. 
 91. 465 U.S. 89, 123–24 (1984). “Given that the actions of the county commissioners 
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be that 
relief granted against these county officials . . . effectively runs against the State.” Id. at 
124 n.34. 
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Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.92 In Pennhurst, the Court refused to 
allow a suit against county officials to proceed but only discussed the 
federal question in a footnote and used state grounds to resolve the 
issue.93 Generally, it noted, relief against “officials of a county . . . is 
barred if the relief obtained runs against the state.”94 It commented 
that the county there might be entitled to immunity on federal, in 
addition to state, grounds, since the county officials depended on 
funding from the state95—specifically, Pennsylvania’s state statute.96 
Thus, the Court looked to the state law to imply that, while counties 
are not typically protected by the Eleventh Amendment, they should 
be protected if not doing so would negatively affect state funds. 
Finally, in Hess, the case was “more complex” because the two 
states’ law was ambiguous, suggesting that both immunity and non-
immunity was appropriate.97 At issue was whether a port authority—
a bi-state entity created by New Jersey, New York, and Congress 
under the Compact Clause98—would be entitled to immunity.99 The 
Court stated its general approach concerning these types of entities, 
which presumed that they do “not qualify for . . . immunity unless 
there is good reason to believe that the States structured [it] to 
enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States 
themselves.”100 The states’ statements were conflicting here: while 
“[t]he compact and its implementing legislation [did] not type [it] 
as a state agency,” state courts had “repeatedly . . . typed [it] an 
agency of the States rather than a municipal unit or local district.”101 
Faced with this inconsistency, the Court was guided by the Eleventh 
Amendment’s reasons for being and whether there was “good reason 
to believe” that “the States and Congress designed [the entity] to 
enjoy . . . immunity.”102 The Court went on to analyze the entity and 
 
 92. 513 U.S. 30, 48–53 (1994). 
 93. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 123–24. 
 94. Id. at 123 n.34. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 124. 
 97. Hess, 513 U.S. at 44. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 99. Hess, 513 U.S. at 35. 
 100. Id. at 43–44 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101. Id. at 44–45. 
 102. Id. at 47. 
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how it had been set up in that light, ultimately concluding that the 
port authority was not immune under the Eleventh Amendment.103 
These decisions are generally well-aligned with the guiding 
principle in that they deferred to the state to determine the most 
fundamental question of state law (i.e., “who is the state”). Notably, 
the question of “who is the state” in these cases was not merely 
tangential to the constitutional question of whether state sovereignty 
was warranted; rather, it lay close to its core. Even still, the Supreme 
Court consistently deferred to the state in making its decisions 
instead of presuming that all the answers rested with the Court. 
Despite this would-be excuse for overlooking state interests, these 
cases show that state considerations truly matter. 
Lincoln is a straightforward example of how federal courts’ 
deference to states does not necessarily tread on the federal 
constitutional sphere. In Mt. Healthy, the Court’s heavy emphasis on 
state law further underscored this principle. It does not appear that 
the state of Ohio had argued one side over another, or that any Ohio 
courts had opined on the matter. Therefore, the Court looked to 
what it could—state statutory law—to determine whether the board 
was more like an arm of the state or a county. 
The Pennhurst decision also supports the guiding principle. 
Though not a firm holding, the Court in Pennhurst at least revealed 
its reasoning that harming the state through county officials militates 
in favor of granting sovereign immunity, which reasoning was based 
on the state law providing counties with state funds. Finally, the Hess 
analysis should prove instructive. Where the state itself is conflicted 
in defining “who is the state,” federal courts should look to the 
underlying reasons for the constitutional provision. While those 
policy reasons will likely differ from those in Hess in a non-sovereign 
immunity case, courts can similarly look to state law in making their 
determinations. For example, in the federal standing context, of 
primary importance is protecting the one actually injured.104 States 
certainly have standing to defend the constitutionality of their own 
laws,105 and in determining whether others can stand in the place of 
the state, federal courts should look to state law, as was done in Hess. 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases do not impinge 
 
 103. Id. at 49–53. 
 104. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 105. Supra note 17. 
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on state sovereignty despite ample opportunity to do so and 
consequently provide strong support for the guiding principle. 
4. The principle’s violation in Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Hollingsworth, on the other hand, violated the guiding principle. 
Whether California could grant authority to proponents to step into 
the state’s shoes was a question of state law—though in the context 
of a federal standing question—which, when overruled by the 
Supreme Court, seriously undermined California’s status as a 
separate sovereign. The Court should have allowed such an 
important interest to outweigh the desire for uniform outcomes. 
a. The issue of who represented California was not an essential 
constitutional question. The Court noted legitimate separation of 
powers concerns when discussing why the proponents had not 
suffered a “particularized injury” and thus did not personally have 
Article III standing.106 After all, granting standing to any individual 
based on personal interest alone could transform the courts into 
more of a political, rather than judicial, branch.107 However, this 
concern was not applicable to the Court’s rejection of the 
proponents’ second attempted avenue into Article III standing. The 
proponents essentially argued that because California has standing 
and because the California Supreme Court approved them as 
representatives of California, the proponents should not be denied 
standing. Despite this, the proponents were rejected for lack of 
standing because they did not represent the State of California. 
However, the only constitutional question (whether California had 
suffered a particularized injury) was clearly answered in the 
affirmative. The separate issue (whether the proponents represented 
California) was not compelled under Article III of the Constitution. 
Although it indeed touched on the main question—it being a subset 
of that question—it was not similarly mandated as a federal 
constitutional question. It was distinctively a state question. After all, 
the only reason state attorneys general (or other executive officers) 
are allowed standing to appear on behalf of the state is because the 
state authorized them to represent the state’s interests. Whether 
 
 106. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 107. Id. (noting that by limiting itself to disputes that are “‘capable of resolution through 
the judicial process.’ . . . [I]t ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking 
properly left to elected representatives”) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). 
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through election, appointment, or by judicial decree, then, it follows 
that the state can authorize whomever it chooses to represent 
its interests. 
The sovereign immunity cases discussed above108 provide further 
support for granting deference to state decisions that are not 
constitutional at their core. Those cases established that the Supreme 
Court looks to state law even where determining “who is the state” is 
closely tied to the central constitutional question at hand. In 
sovereign immunity cases, determining “who is the state” consumes 
almost the entire analysis; in federal standing cases, it is but a subset 
of the larger constitutional question. Thus, as the question of “who 
is the state” in Hollingsworth was only loosely tied to the 
constitutional question of standing, deference to California should 
have been freely granted in that case. 
 b. The Court was motivated by nothing more than a mere desire to 
maintain uniformity in federal jurisprudence. Although the 
Hollingsworth Court appeared to be concerned with a number of 
considerations in trumping state law, it seems that it was in reality 
motivated solely by a desire to maintain uniformity in the law.109 In 
holding that the proponents lacked standing, the Court expressed 
concern that persons representing a state might not have a fiduciary 
duty to the state.110 However, as between federal courts and actual 
states, the states seem to be in a better position to decide whether 
this fiduciary duty should be determinative. After all, states are 
inherently interested in their own best interests, while it is 
questionable whether the same is true of federal courts. The state is 
ultimately responsible for its own decision (however wise or foolish it 
may be) and has to live with the consequences of that decision, while 
 
 108. Supra Part IV.A.3. 
 109. The Court might also have been motivated by a desire to “punt” on issuing a 
sweeping same-sex marriage decision, but this reason is construed as invalid in this Comment. 
See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the Court 
must be cautious before entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and 
society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most difficult subject. But it is 
shortsighted to misconstrue principles of justiciability to avoid that subject.”); Brett 
LoGiurato, Supreme Court Punts on Prop 8—Gay Marriage Becomes Legal in California, BUS. 
INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/prop-8-supreme-court-ruling-gay-marriage-2013-
6 (June 26, 2013, 10:28 AM) (“The Supreme Court . . . punted on a sweeping decision on 
California’s Proposition 8, effectively making gay marriage legal in California.”). The only 
valid reason, as discussed in this Part, seems to be a desire to maintain uniformity in the law. 
 110. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657–58. 
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the consequences of federal courts’ decisions of state law are at least 
somewhat externalized from those courts. Even assuming the Court 
was motivated by genuine concern, it is doubtful whether it was 
more fit to the task than the state itself. It seems the California high 
court is better able to judge the best interests of California than the 
Supreme Court could do in a broad generalization for all fifty states. 
Consequently, a federal court’s claim that it is able to act in a state’s 
best interests should be highly suspect. In other words, although 
states cannot determine federal law, states should be able to decide 
who represents them, and federal courts should respect 
those decisions. 
As acting in the state’s best interest does not seem to be a valid 
rationale for the Supreme Court’s reaching into state law, there are 
few other legs the Court has to stand on. The issue was not 
compelled by Article III standing requirements since the Court’s 
analysis thereunder did not need to go further than to declare 
whether California suffered a particularized injury. As for defining 
who California is, the Court’s analysis was not compelled; California 
had answered the question, and the Court should have deferred 
thereto. The possibilities thus reduce to one likely motivation: in 
deciding that the proponents cannot represent the state unless they 
are agents of the state—which in effect overruled California’s 
decision to the contrary—the only real federal justification was to 
preserve uniformity in the federal law. While not stated explicitly, this 
conclusion is readily deducible. After all, the Court could have 
allowed each state to be bound by the agency law in its respective 
state but instead chose to crystalize the Restatement of Agency as 
the new standard for all fifty states. 
This desire for uniformity is an understandable one, as 
uniformity in federal law could foreseeably give clear direction to 
lower courts and make for easier, more efficient decision-making. 
Indeed, allowing each state to independently decide “who is the 
state” for standing purposes makes for a certain amount of 
unpredictability in the federal law. However, while perhaps being less 
conducive to uniform outcomes, allowing states to decide state 
questions where there is no substantial intrusion on federal interests 
could still serve as a uniform principle to guide lower courts. The 
Court could have had it both ways by adopting the guiding principle 
while still respecting California’s sovereignty. 
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 c. The ruling significantly impinged on California’s status as a 
separate sovereign. However arguable the previous points may be, it is 
patently clear that the holding significantly impinged on California’s 
status as a separate sovereign independent from the federal 
government. The California Supreme Court took a stance in the 
name of the state and the U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected that 
stance. Granted, the Supremacy Clause111 and its interpretation112 
allow for certain types of superiority over state sovereignty, but the 
guiding principle posits that such domineering should not be 
allowed where there is no sufficient reason to do so. State 
sovereignty is, after all, no small matter. The Eleventh Amendment 
and its jurisprudence, for example, “emphasize[] the integrity 
retained by each State in our federal system,” and “‘accord[] the 
States the respect owed them as members of the federation.’”113 Any 
intrusion on this sphere should at least be justified by more than 
mere convenience. The implications of this federal overreaching are 
severe, extending beyond the problem of undefended public 
initiatives and tipping the scales of federalism unfavorably against 
the states. 
5. Ambiguous Wording: An Alternative Basis for 
Deciding Hollingsworth 
Although the Supreme Court violated the guiding principle in 
Hollingsworth, there was a potentially legitimate basis on which it 
could have denied standing to the proponents. After all, it is 
arguable whether the California Supreme Court declared clearly 
enough the state’s desire to confer authority to represent the state’s 
interests. Conferring the power to represent the state is a serious 
matter for a state court and should only be allowed by federal courts 
when it is completely clear that such a conferral is intended by the 
state. There should be a presumption of non-conferral to third 
 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 112. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1958) (holding that federal law trumps state 
law and states are bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions). 
 113. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39–40 (1994) (quoting P.R. 
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). 
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parties, rebuttable only by unmistakable wording from the state high 
court or legislature indicating intent to confer. Once the intent to 
confer is clearly expressed, however, federal courts should defer to 
the states in determining this question, which is “antecedent to 
determining federal standing.”114 
In Hollingsworth, the California court seemed careful in its 
wording, indicating that the proponents could “assert” the state’s 
interest but never using the word “represent” as included in the 
proponents’ authority to appeal the judgment. The court seemed to 
recognize a difference between the two words’ meanings since it 
used “represent” in reference to many other cases and situations115 
and even in reference to the proponents’ intervention at the district 
court level.116 The court used “assert” almost exclusively in reference 
to the proponents’ authority to appeal a state court decision,117 
though it did use the word four times in reference to other cases and 
hypothetical situations.118 This careful usage suggests that, although 
the verb “to assert” is arguably interchangeable with “to represent,” 
the court did not unmistakably intend to confer the authority to 
represent California. After all, the words are not perfectly 
synonymous; for example, amicus curiae can assert a party’s interest 
but not officially represent it—representing the interest is reserved 
solely to the parties in the case.119 
Under this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals failed 
to elicit a clear response and to adequately overcome the 
presumption of non-conferral. In its certified question to the 
California Supreme Court, it posed the question with “assert,” not 
“represent,” wording, which set the question on a track to 
ambiguity.120 When the state court answered accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit seemed to transform the state’s “assert” wording into 
 
 114. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 115. For example, the court noted that in Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987), 
legislative officers could “represent the state’s interest in defending a challenged state law.” 
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1012 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 116. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1008. 
 117. The court used the word “assert” (or some derivative of it) over eighty times in 
reference to the initiative proponents alone. Id. at 1002–33. 
 118. Id. at 1024 n.19, 1024–26. 
 119. See id. at 1025. 
 120. Id. at 1008. 
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“represent” wording, using the latter term much more frequently 
than the former.121 
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court should have 
certified a more specific question to the California Supreme Court. 
As it failed to do this, it should have, at a minimum, based its 
decision on the failure of California to clearly delegate, rather than 
on a blanket rule forever prohibiting delegations of the kind. Such a 
move could have saved the Court from the “shortsighted” holding 
that “misconstrue[d] principles of justiciability.”122 Whether this 
decision was motivated by “cauti[on] [in] entering . . . [the] most 
difficult subject” of same-sex marriage,123 a desire to preserve 
uniform outcomes, or some other justification, any gains hardly seem 
worth the heavy blow dealt to the standing doctrine and 
state sovereignty. 
B. The Supreme Court Should Mend its Doctrine 
The solution to the problem at issue is conceptually quite simple. 
As concerning initiative-made law that is challenged in federal court, 
the Supreme Court should defer to the state when the state has 
clearly declared who may represent the state’s interests in federal 
court rather than mandating a national standard on all states. This 
would allow the Court to undo its violation of the guiding principle, 
which violation currently significantly impinges on state sovereignty 
while being justified only by a simple desire for uniformity in federal 
jurisprudence. Such a change in the doctrine would not cause any 
significant harm to federal courts but would undo significant harm 
to the states. 
As a practical matter, this doctrinal change will not come easily. 
After all, lower courts will continue to follow the Hollingsworth 
precedent until it is overturned by the Supreme Court; this will serve 
as a wall barring change at both the district and appellate levels of 
federal court. Thus, only through risky appeals and petitions for writ 
of certiorari will initiative proponents be able to effect this change in 
the law. Nevertheless, such attempts would be worth the effort 
because this change in the doctrine would allow for a much-needed 
 
 121. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 122. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. 
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bolstering of citizen initiatives and restore balance to the 
federalism system. 
C. Other Proposed Remedies and Why the Guiding Principle is 
Still Needed 
Since the Hollingsworth decision, a number of ideas have 
surfaced for solving the newfound problem of how to defend ballot 
initiatives when state officials refuse to do so. These solutions include 
proposed state legislation that creates an independent office or a 
specific government official tasked with defending ballot initiatives, 
and allowing state legislators to represent the state. The guiding 
principle would certainly not work against most of these proposals, 
but none of them are sufficient without the 
principle’s implementation. 
1. Enact laws enabling the state to appoint a special attorney 
Constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky proposes that 
states with ballot initiatives should change their laws to ensure that 
initiatives will always have a fair defense when they would otherwise 
go undefended by the state. Under his solution, these states should 
enact laws requiring the state to appoint a “special attorney” to 
represent the state when the state officials who would ordinarily 
defend the initiative refuse to do so.124 “[S]ince states get to decide 
for themselves who will represent them in court,” he argues, this 
solution would pass legal muster.125 After all, the attorney appointed 
by the state would be representing the state, even if the attorney 
were “not a state employee.”126 His point is that because states have 
standing to defend their laws that are challenged in court, and 
because states can choose who represents those interests, an 
appointment would confer on the special attorney Article III 
standing, at least for these limited purposes and circumstances. 
Implied in his proposal is that the proponents in Hollingsworth were 
not adequately appointed by the state to act as the state, because, as 
he interprets Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court does not allow 
 
 124. Chemerinsky, supra note 9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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“supporters of a law” to defend the law when the government 
declines to do so.127 
Professor Chemerinsky’s proposal takes a step in the right 
direction in solving this dilemma, but it suffers from two major 
flaws. First, to put it bluntly, his proposal would not work unless the 
Supreme Court changes its doctrine as outlined above. He asserts 
that the special attorney could represent the state, even if the 
attorney were “not a state employee;”128 however, under the current 
doctrine only formal agents of the state can represent the state. His 
proposal assumes that the state can freely appoint people to represent 
the state but Hollingsworth shows that exactly the opposite is true: 
indeed, Hollingsworth establishes that the state is not completely free 
to appoint at will, as the California Supreme Court’s statement was 
apparently insufficient to grant authority. It is unclear whether a state 
statute would significantly change this. For example, Justice 
Sotomayor questioned, during Hollingsworth oral arguments, why 
the California Supreme Court’s declaration that the “ballot initiators 
have now become [the appointed] body” was not “viewed as an 
appointment process” similar to the one proposed by 
Chemerinsky.129 Without implementation of the guiding principle, 
which is necessary to grant states their due freedom, it is unlikely 
that his plan would work. 
Second, his proposal assumes that special attorneys cannot be 
appointed if they are “supporters of a law” that is not being 
defended.130 This interesting requirement would not only prevent 
those who would arguably defend the law most vigorously from 
doing so but would also encourage those with interests adverse to 
the law to “defend” it weakly. Even if this unwieldy political bias test 
were workable, the outcomes would not be desirable. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144). 
 130. Chemerinsky, supra note 9. 
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2. Enact laws enabling the state to appoint an independent office 
Walter Dellinger submitted a proposal, similar to Chemerinsky’s, 
in his Hollingsworth amicus brief.131 Dellinger suggests that states 
“create an independent office responsible for defending initiatives in 
cases in which the Attorney General declines to do so.”132 Under this 
plan, the state might appoint officers who would be subject to the 
state’s control (e.g., subject to “removal for cause by the Governor 
or Attorney General”).133 It is unclear whether this independent 
office, and the officers defending the law, would be in operation 
continuously or would only be activated when needed. 
The main flaw in Dellinger’s proposal is that it requires the state 
to go to unnecessarily great lengths to solve the dilemma. A state 
should not be required to create an entirely new office just to 
appoint a representative of a state law. It seems that, once created, 
the office would be in operation continuously. As challenged 
initiative-made laws do not seem to go undefended by the state 
attorney general very often, the office would create high operation 
costs for a very small and infrequent benefit. It is unlikely that such a 
wasteful setup would be popular among state constituents, so it is 
highly unlikely it would be implemented as a general solution. 
3. State legislators could represent the state 
Another potential solution lies in state legislators’ ability to 
represent the state’s interests on appeal. In Karcher v. May,134 
presiding officers in the New Jersey state legislature attempted to 
represent New Jersey’s interests on federal appeal. They were 
eventually denied standing, but only after losing the state’s 
pronouncement of their authority to represent the state’s interests, 
which came after the officers lost their presiding officer statuses.135 
Thus, it seems that if similar legislative officers gained (and 
maintained) the state supreme court’s blessing, they would have 
Article III standing to represent an initiative on federal appeal. This 
 
 131. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents on the Issue of 
Standing at 30–32, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). Dellinger 
also outlined four other potential solutions in addition to this one. Id. 
 132. Id. at 32. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
 135. Id. at 82; see also supra Part III.A.1. 
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scenario is very similar to the facts in Hollingsworth, the main 
difference being that the appointed representatives are actual officials 
of the state. 
While presiding officers of a state legislature may theoretically be 
able to defend initiative-made law, this option would most likely not 
work in practice. State legislatures generally do not support citizen 
initiatives, which is precisely why citizens attempt to circumvent 
legislatures in voting on initiatives.136 With such an adverse interest in 
most cases, legislators would likely not have a strong incentive to 
defend the law. Also, as in Karcher, a legislative officer’s status in a 
presiding position seems highly subject to change, especially during 
the drawn-out periods of time that cases can remain pending on 
appeal. Since challenges to standing can be raised sua sponte or by 
any party at any point in litigation,137 this seems to be a feeble 
solution at best. Any virtues of the solution do not sufficiently 
reduce the infringement on state sovereignty to justify preventing 
better alternatives for states. 
4. Do nothing 
A fourth solution, inferred from the Hollingsworth decision, 
would be to essentially do nothing. Under this argument, the 
political process will take care of itself because the people have the 
power to “vote out” any executive officials, such as governors or 
attorneys general, for failing to defend the law that the people 
implemented. After replacing the disfavored officials with popular 
ones, the people could reinstate the law (if changed on appeal) 
through their new representatives or through another public 
initiative, or even through another lawsuit. Thus, the people would 
have the final say if an executive official’s decision to not defend the 
law were an unpopular one. 
If this “solution” were to work, it would rely on the successful 
implementation of an extremely difficult, multi-step, strategic 
process that would require extensive coordination efforts. Even with 
 
 136. See supra Part II. 
 137. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (explaining the 
Supreme Court’s obligation “to examine standing sua sponte where standing has erroneously 
been assumed below,” but not “simply to reach an issue for which standing has been denied 
below”); Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (noting the appellate court’s requirement to “examine [standing] on [its] own motion” 
regardless of whether any parties object). 
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a strong statewide consensus that the law should be reinstated, the 
low chances of success pitted against the extraordinary amount of 
effort required would stifle most of the public’s enthusiasm to even 
try. In Proposition 8’s case, the people of California had already 
voted twice for traditional marriage before the law was eventually 
reversed by the federal district court.138 Even if California citizens 
had wanted to reinstate the law following Hollingsworth, their 
motivation to do so had probably been stifled by that point. Rather 
than suppress state sovereignty by only allowing for such a non-
workable solution, federal courts should recognize that when the 
state declares who may represent it, that is the final word. 
5. Why the proposed solutions are insufficient 
The guiding principle allows for a wide variety of creative 
solutions to the undefended-initiative problem. Even assuming that 
this Comment’s predictions are wrong regarding the workability of 
the first three proposed solutions, the guiding principle has room for 
these, in addition to anything else individual states can imagine. 
States should be free to experiment with these and other solutions as 
they see fit, despite their imperfections. By implementing the 
guiding principle in federal jurisprudence, any policy problems 
would be localized to the individual states rather than inflicted on 
the entire nation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ballot initiative is a valuable method of democratic 
lawmaking in many states, but its viability has been threatened 
through the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Hollingsworth v. 
Perry. Now, initiative measures that are challenged in federal court 
and that executive officials refuse to defend are left essentially 
defenseless. The true solution to the dilemma ultimately depends on 
the Supreme Court changing its jurisprudence to provide for a 
proper balance between state and federal interests. More specifically, 
the Supreme Court should mend the doctrine by deferring to the 
state’s delegation of authority to represent its interest in court. Such 
a change would significantly benefit states without significantly 
harming the federal system. It would also protect the essential 
 
 138. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
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elements of public initiatives, thus preserving an important facilitator 
of democracy. 
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